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James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wise
Thew ay households support themselves in retirement is changing rapidly.
Historically, households in the United States have relied on a combination
of Social Security, employer-provided deﬁned beneﬁt pensions, and per-
sonal saving to support their retirement years. In the last ﬁfteen years,
however, retirement saving programs such as 401(k) plans have become an
increasingly common component of household retirement planning. To-
day, more than 35 million workers participate in 401(k) saving plans, and
the annual contribution ﬂow to these plans exceeds $100 billion. The tax-
deferred nature of wealth accumulation in 401(k)-type plans, coupled with
often generous employer matching contributions that enhance the value of
employee contributions, make these plans a powerful vehicle for accumu-
lating retirement wealth. Mass market books, such as Iwaszko and O’Con-
nell (1999) and Merritt (1997), have extolled the wealth-building power of
401(k) accounts.
In Poterba, Venti, and Wise (hereafter PVW; 1998a), we showed that
evenw ithc onservative assumptions about the future growth of 401(k) con-
tributions, the average 401(k) balance for households reaching retirement
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23in 2025 will be approximately equal to the average actuarial present value
of Social Security beneﬁts. This represents roughly a tenfold increase in
the importance of 401(k) accumulations between the late 1990s and 2025.
Although 401(k) plan accumulations are likely to account for a very
substantial share of the net worth of future retirees, unlike Social Security
beneﬁts, they can be aﬀected by a number of individual decisions. Individ-
uals who work at ﬁrms that oﬀer 401(k) plans must decide whether to
participate in their employers’ plans. Those who do not participate forego
the opportunity to accumulate retirement wealth in this tax-deferred form.
Conditional on participating, individuals must decide how much of their
earnings to contribute to the plan.
When 401(k) participants leave jobs at which they have participated in
a 401(k) plan, they can withdraw their accumulated 401(k) assets from the
retirement saving system. When such withdrawals occur before the recipi-
enti sﬁ f ty-nine and one-half years old, they are taxed as ordinary income,
as all 401(k) payouts are, and they are also subject to a 10 percent early
withdrawal penalty tax. Participants who leave their jobs can also choose
to leave their 401(k) accumulations in their former employers’ plans, or
to roll over their assets either into an individual retirement arrangement
(IRA) or into the 401(k) plan of a new employer. The ﬂexibility aﬀorded
by these three options enhances the portability of 401(k) beneﬁts. It re-
duces the risk, not uncommon in deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans, of forfeit-
ing pension beneﬁts as a result of job change. However, the ﬂexibility asso-
ciated with the 401(k) withdrawal option raises the possibility that 401(k)
participants may draw down their account balances before retirement, and
thereby reach retirement without assets in a 401(k) account.
An umber of recent studies have noted that conditional on choosing to
withdraw assets from the 401(k) system, i.e., conditional on receiving a
“lump-sum distribution,” many individuals use their withdrawals in a way
that does notpreserve retirement saving. In PVW (1998b)we showed, how-
ever, that older workers, and those who receive larger lump-sum distribu-
tions,aremuch morelikelytopreservetheretirementbeneﬁtsoftheirlump-
sum distributions through IRA rollovers or other forms of saving. These
ﬁndings, based on data from the Current Population Survey, are conﬁrmed
in Sabelhaus and Weiner’s (1999) analysis of tax return information.
Until recently, there was no information on the probability that a worker
leaving a job would decide to withdraw assets from the employer’s 401(k)
plan and therefore receivealump-sum distribution. Analyzing the behav-
ioro fthose who received lump-sum distributions therefore provided only
ap artial account of beneﬁt leakage from 401(k) plans. In an important
recent study, however, Hurd, Lillard, and Panis (1998) analyze data on the
disposition of deﬁned contribution pension assets when workers change
jobs. They analyze information from the Health and Retirement Survey
and ﬁnd that very few participants in these pension plans select the with-
drawal option when they leave their jobs.
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retirement saving plans to gauge the importance of such withdrawals on
the saving balances of future retirees. We expand the algorithm for pro-
jecting future 401(k) balances that we developed in PVW (1998a) to allow
for job changes during an individual’s working life, and the associated risk
of 401(k) asset withdrawal. While we abstract from many detailed features
of the asset withdrawal process, we allow for age-speciﬁc job termination
risks, and for balance-speciﬁc probabilities of withdrawing assets from a
401(k) account. We also allow for realistic expenses of managing the assets
in 401(k) plans.
We ﬁnd that even though a substantial number of workers change jobs,
and could withdraw their 401(k) assets, the modest withdrawal rate and
the small size of most withdrawals reduce retirement saving only modestly.
Our central estimates suggest that the opportunity to take 401(k) with-
drawals reduces retirement saving at retirement by approximately 5 per-
cent.E vena f ter allowing for preretirement withdrawals, we ﬁnd that
401(k) saving will expand rapidly over the next three decades, and that
401(k) assets at retirement are likely to grow, on average, to be roughly as
important as current Social Security wealth in contributing to households’
retirement ﬁnancing.
This paper is divided into six sections. Section 1.1 summarizes the recent
studies that have explored the importance of lump-sum distributions from
401(k) plans and other retirement saving plans. Section 1.2 describes our
algorithm for projecting the 401(k) balances of future cohorts of retirees,
and particularly our attempts to allow for preretirement asset withdrawals.
We calibrate our model using data from the 1993 Survey of Income and
Program Participation and the Health and Retirement Survey. Section 1.3
presents evidence on how actual 401(k) balances for households in the
Health and Retirement Survey compare with the balances that our algo-
rithm would have predicted for these households, had we not known their
actual plan balance. Section 1.4 reports our projected future account bal-
ances and examines the importance of preretirement withdrawals in af-
fecting these balances. Section 1.5 reports preliminary statistics on 401(k)
participation from the 1995 Survey of Income and Program Participation,
andusesthesedatatoprovidesomeindicationoftheplausibilityofourpro-
jected rates of 401(k) expansion. Finally, a brief concluding section sug-
gests several directions for further work.
1.1 What Do We Know about Lump-Sum Distributions
and 401(k) “Leakage”?
Theg rowth of retirement saving accounts, in particular 401(k) accounts,
during the last two decades has substantially expanded the ﬁnancial assets
of many U.S. households. The expansion of personal retirement saving has
raised new questions about the impact of individual ﬁnancial decisions on
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several dimensions, including plan participation, contribution level, asset
allocation, date of asset withdrawal, and whether to annuitize account
payouts, along which individuals can inﬂuence their 401(k) retirement ac-
cumulations.
One of the most important decisions individuals face is whether to draw
down assets in retirement saving accounts before retirement. A number of
summary statistics on the prevalence of lump-sum distributions have
raised concern about the possibility that households are not preserving
their retirement saving. The most recent data on the extent and use of such
distributions are from the U.S. Department of Labor (1995). The data are
based on the September 1994 “Retiree Pension and Health Beneﬁts Sup-
plement” to the Current Population Survey (CPS). This survey shows that
9.1 million individuals (all over the age of forty) reported that they had
receiveda tl e ast one lump-sum distribution from a pension plan or retire-
ment saving account. This is nearly 10 percent of the over-forty popula-
tion,a nd it is an even greater share of the labor force in this age range.
Them ean lump-sum distribution, measured in 1994 dollars, was
$22,309. More than half of these distributions (52.8 percent) were received
by workers who were between the ages of thirty and forty-nine at the time
of the distribution. The CPS questionnaire included information on lump-
sum distributions from a range of diﬀerent retirement plans. Payouts from
deﬁned beneﬁt plans in which the separating employee had accumulated
onlyasmall vested pension beneﬁt, from traditional deﬁned contribution
pension plans, as well as from 401(k)-like retirement saving programs were
included in the CPS survey. Of the 9.1 million lump-sum distributions re-
ported in the survey, 2.7 million were identiﬁed as from deﬁned beneﬁt
plans, 5.3 million were from deﬁned contribution plans, and 1.1 million
distributions were receivedb yi ndividuals who could not identify the type
of plan that they were from.
Probably the greatest concern with the substantial number of lump-sum
distributions is that many of their recipients report that they did not use
their distributions to provide income in retirement. Table 1.1 shows the
usesoflump-sumdistributionsreportedinthe1994CPSsupplement.More
than one quarter of those who reported a single primary use of their lump-
sum distribution (1.82 million of the 6.85 million respondents with a pri-
mary use) indicated that their distributions were used to ﬁnance consumer
durable purchases or to pay other expenses. Only 33.9 percent reported
that they rolled over their lump-sum distributions into IRAs or retirement
plans with new employers. A substantial additional group, comprising 39.5
percent of the primary-use respondents, indicated that their distributions
were used for something that could be construed as saving, but were not
targeted for retirement income support. Responses in this category include
depositing the lump-sum distribution in a saving account, paying oﬀ debts,
or using the proceeds for home renovations.
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PVW (1998b), and Yakaboski (1993, 1997) has shown that the use to which
a lump-sum distribution is put is a function of household age and the size
of the distribution. Thus an asset-weighted version of table 1.1 would show
ad i ﬀerent allocation of lump-sum distributions than the person-weighted
tabulation that is actually reported in the table. Older workers, and those
with larger distributed balances, are more likely to choose a rollover option
or to report that they saved their distributions. The fraction of lump-sum
distribution dollars that are withdrawn from the 401(k) system is much
smaller than the fraction of individuals whor eceive lump-sum distribu-
tionsw ho report that they withdrew funds from their retirement saving.
There is also some evidence, reported, for example, in Bassett, Fleming,
and Rodriguez (1998) and Chang (1996), that the share of lump-sum distri-
butions that are rolled over into saving vehicles or new retirement saving
accounts has increased over time.
The critical diﬃculty with using data on lump-sum distributions to
study asset leakage from the 401(k) system is that individuals who leave
jobs with 401(k) plans can choose whether to receive lump-sum distribu-
tions. The sample of lump-sum distribution recipients provides no insight
on the probability that an individual experiencing a job separation will
decide to withdraw funds from the 401(k) system. The individual could
also choose to allow the 401(k) balance to remain with the previous em-
ployer, or to roll the 401(k) balance into a 401(k) plan with a new em-
ployer. Neither of these options would trigger a lump-sum distribution. If
most individuals experiencing a job separation choose one of these op-
tions, then the probability of 401(k) leakage might be quite small even if
most of those taking lump-sum distributions do not roll over their 401(k)
assets.
Hurd, Lillard, and Panis (1998) use data on individuals in the Health
Table 1.1 Uses of Lump-Sum Pension Plan Distributions Reported in September
1994 Current Population Survey Supplement
Number of Recipients Percent of Primary-
Use of Lump-Sum Distribution (millions) Use Recipients
Retirement saving 2.32 33.9
Business or home expansion, or
repaying debts 1.46 21.3
Other saving or investments 1.25 18.2
Current spending 1.82 26.6
Total identifying primary use 6.85 100.0
Multiple uses 1.53 —
Other uses, or no response 0.73 —
Total 9.10 —
Source: U.S. Department of Labor (1995), table C5.
Preretirement Cashouts and Foregone Retirement Savings 27and Retirement Survey (HRS) who experience a job change between ei-
ther the ﬁrst and second survey waves, or between the second and third
waves, to estimate the probability of asset withdrawal. Their ﬁndings show
that only 20.5 percent of the workers leaving deﬁned contribution pension
plans (including 401[k] plans), and 16.4 percent of those leaving jobs with
deﬁned beneﬁt plans, choose to cash out their accumulations in the form
of lump-sum distributions. Moreover, the cashout probability is lower for
those with large balances. Only 6.7 percent of the assets held in deﬁned
contribution plans by those who experience job termination are withdrawn
from the retirement saving system. These statistics suggest that the possi-
bility of withdrawing assets from a 401(k) plan is not likely to have a large
impact on the prospective growth of assets in these plans.
Engelhardt (1999) performs a related calculation using data from the
HRS. Using data on individual reports of past lump-sum distributions, he
“accumulates” the value of these withdrawals under the counterfactual
assumption that they had been left in retirement saving accounts. He ﬁnds
that for the median household that receivedalump-sum distribution, the
current value of this distribution is between 8 and 11 percent of the value
of Social Security wealth and other pension wealth. The range depends
on assumptions about the way 401(k) participants invest their assets.
These ﬁndings suggest that lump-sum distributions from 401(k)-type
plans have probably not had a large eﬀecto nthe accumulated balances in
these retirement saving accounts. However, it is still possible that such
distributions will have a larger eﬀect on future accumulations in these ac-
counts, since 401(k) plans will be available to more young workers in the
future than in the past. Young workers have much higher job turnover
rates than older workers. The calculationsw ep r esent below are designed
to provide new insight on the prospective importance of such preretire-
ment payouts.
1.2 An Algorithm for Projecting Future 401(k) Balances
This section describes our approach to forecasting the 401(k) balances
at retirement for currently working cohorts. We build on our prior work,
reported in PVW (1998a), but expand our previous algorithm to incorpo-
rate job change, lump-sum distributions, and potential asset leakage from
the 401(k) system into our analysis. We also introduce administrative costs
of asset management into our forecasting algorithm.
Our procedure for projecting the 401(k) assets of future retirees relies on
ac ohortr epresentation of data on 401(k) participation and contribution
behavior. The notation C(j) refers to the cohort of age j in 1984. C(27), for
example, refers to the cohort aged twenty-seven in 1984. Figure 1.1, which
is reproduced from our earlier paper, shows 401(k) eligibility rates for six
cohorts that are based on Survey of Income and Program Participation
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C(25) and C(15) cohorts, which were aged thirty-four and twenty-four,
respectively, in 1993. For the C(25) cohort, age ﬁfty-ﬁve occurs in 2014,
and age sixty-ﬁve in 2024. The C(15) cohort reaches each of these ages ten
years later.
To ensure adequate sample sizes, each of the cohort points plotted in
ﬁgure 1.1 is based on a group of families with household heads born in a
ﬁve-year interval. The C(27) cohort therefore includes families with heads
aged twenty-ﬁve to twenty-nine in 1984. The C(27) cohort is identiﬁed by
the square symbols. The eligibility rate of this cohort averaged less than 10
percent in 1984, but it had risen to almost 45 percent by 1993 when the
cohort was thirty-six years old. A similar increase in eligibility is evident
fore ach of the other ﬁve cohorts. It is also clear that there is a very large
“cohort eﬀect.” At any age each successively younger cohort has a higher
contribution rate than the cohort ﬁve years older. This diﬀerence is approx-
imately 20 percentage points. For example, 44 percent of the C(27) cohort
was 401(k) eligible when this cohort was thirty-ﬁve years old, compared
with about 20 percent of the ﬁve-year-older C(32) cohort when it was
thirty-ﬁve.
The information in ﬁgure 1.1 illustrates the cross-sectional relationship
between age and eligibility at each survey date. The six markers along the
topo fthe ﬁgure represent the 1993 cross-sectional relationship between
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Fig. 1.1 401(k) eligibility by cohort, 1984, 1987, 1991, 1993agea nd eligibility. It shows rising eligibility at young ages, followed by a
plateau. Comparable data for earlier years show a less pronounced eﬀect
of ageo neligibility.
1.2.1 Projecting Future 401(k) Participation Rates
Extrapolation of cohort trends would quickly lead to the implausible
projection of eligibility rates of over 100 percent. On the other hand, it is
equally clear that when the C(27) cohort reaches age forty its eligibility
rate will be greater than the rate of the C(32) cohort at age forty. Thus,
instead of extrapolating the cohort data, we parameterize the relationship
between age and eligibility, assuming that the apparent cohort eﬀects in
the ﬁgure are year eﬀects and simply represent the spread of 401(k)’s with
time. With reference to ﬁgure 1.1, this means that we estimate eligibility
by allowing the cross-sectional relationship to shift upward over time.
When we allow for both cohort and year eﬀects in regression equations in
which 401(k) participation rates are the dependent variables, the cohort
eﬀects are typically not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and
the time eﬀects exhibit most of the explanatory power.
The diﬃculty with extrapolating past experience to project future 401(k)
balances can be illustrated by reference to the C(27) cohort. If 401(k) plans
continue to spread, then the 1993 cross-sectional relationship between eli-
gibility and age will clearly understate the future eligibility of the C(27)
cohort. In part this is simply because 401(k)s will undoubtedly continue
to expand.I naddition,h owever, the 1993 relationship is determined in
part by how the past diﬀusion of 401(k) plans occurred. If the diﬀusion of
plans has been slower in small ﬁrms with younger workers than in large
ﬁrms, then the cross-sectional relationship would tend to look as it does
in the ﬁgure. In the 1993 cross-section there is a noticeable reduction in
eligibility with age. This is much less apparent in the 1984 cross-section.
Thus we can use only formal estimates as a guide to future patterns.
We assume that by 2013, which is twenty years after the 1993 survey on
whicho ur data are based, the eligibility rate for ﬁfty-six-year-olds (the
C[27] cohort) will be 50 percent higher than the eligibility rate of the cohort
that was ﬁfty-six in 1993. This assumption is based on the past growth in
eligibility and participation rates reported on IRS Form 5500 and in CPS
data. Form 5500 reports1 show that the number of 401(k) participants in-
creased by 52 percent over the ﬁve-year period between 1988 and 1993.
Employment grew by 4 percent over this period. Data from the CPS show
a4 5p ercent increase in the participation rate in 401(k) plans, which is
roughly consistent with the Form 5500 data. The Form 5500 data also
1. See U.S. Department of Labor (1997). The Form 5500 reports tabulate contributions to
private sector 401(k) plans. They do not include contributions to Section 457 (public sector)
or 403(b) (nonproﬁt) plans, or public employees’ contributions to 401(k) plans.
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much more than the increase in participation. Aggregate earnings in-
creased about 25 percent over this period, so if the average fraction of
earnings contributed were stable, the growth in earnings and participation
would predict a 77 percent increase in aggregate contributions. This is very
similar to the observed change.
1.2.2 Cross-Sectional Age Participation Proﬁles
and Participation Projections
Our projections are based on recent 401(k) participation data along
with assumptions on the future evolution of both eligibility and participa-
tion.W er ecognize throughout our analysis that there is an important rela-
tionship among earnings, eligibility, and participation, and we allow for
this by estimating cross-sectional probit equations relating eligibility or
participation to age and indicator variables for earnings deciles. We model
participation (Pi)f o rh o usehold i as
(1) AGE AGE )
2 PD ii i
d
dd i i =+ + +




where AGE is age and the Dd are indicator variables that identify the
household’s earnings decile. The most important parameters are the d,
which indicate the eﬀecto fe a rnings decile Dd on participation. These co-
eﬃcients are the basis for our stratiﬁcation of 401(k) accumulation pat-
terns by household earnings. In PVW (1998a), we report estimation results
from models like equation (1) for eligibility, participation given eligibility,
and participation, using 1988 and 1993 SIPP data. We do not reproduce
those results here.
We use our projection algorithm to explore future 401(k) balances for
households headed by individuals in the C(25) cohort, the C(15) cohort,
and for a cohort that is exposed to a mandatory 401(k)-type program with
universal contributions. The last case resembles some of the proposals that
have recently been discussed in the U.S. Social Security reform debate.
To project future 401(k) asset accumulation for the C(25) cohort, we
assume that when this cohort is ﬁfty-ﬁve years old (in 2014) it will have a
401(k) participation rate 50 percent higher than that of the cohort that
wasﬁ f ty-ﬁve in 1994. We further assume that its participation rate at sixty-
ﬁve will be 5 percent higher than this—that is, 55 percent higher than that
of the cohort aged ﬁfty-ﬁve in 1994. The projections by earnings decile
start from the 1993 401(k) participation rates. Because higher-income
households have higher participation rates, the projections yield a widen-
ing diﬀerence between the participation rates of high- and low-income
families as they age. The extent of this dispersion is likely to be one of the
most uncertain features of our projections.
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tion as well as the C(15) projection. To place the projections further in the
context of the historical data, a projection for the C(27) cohort is also
shown in the ﬁgure.
Them embers of the C(15) cohort were ﬁfteen years old in 1984. Even
though this cohort is only ten years younger than the C(25) cohort, we ﬁnd
it substantially more diﬃcult to make plausible assumptions about their
future 401(k) participation rates. We think of the C(15) projections as rep-
resenting 401(k) accumulation in a setting inw hich participation is sub-
stantially higher than with the C(25) projections, but considerably short
of universal coverage. We believe that future 401(k) participation will in-
deed be higher than the C(25) projections suggest. Our C(15) projections
assume that 401(k) participation rates for the median wage earner are 20
percentage points greater than the C(25) rates. Rates for the highest and
lowest decile workers in the C(15) cohort are assumed to be slightly less
than 20 percent greater than those of comparable workers in the C(25)
cohort.2 This 20 percentage point increase in 401(k) participation for co-
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Fig. 1.2 401(k) eligibility by cohort with illustrative projections
2. We projected participation for all ages of the C(15) cohort by adding a constant term
to the participation probit equation so that the C(25) projections for the 5th and 6th income
deciles would increase by 20 percentage points. The same constant term was added to the
probit equations for all income deciles. The highest deciles do not increase by 20 points
because of the upper limit of 100 percent; the lower deciles increase less than 20 points,
because of the properties of the probit functional form.horts ten years apart is modest compared with what we have observed in
recent years. In ﬁgure 1.1, for example, we ﬁnd that 401(k) eligibility has
risen by 20 percentage points for cohorts only ﬁve years apart. Our projec-
tions therefore assume future 401(k) eligibility growth at roughly half the
recent rate.
Finally, we consider a third scenario for future 401(k) growth, in which
everyone contributes a ﬁxed share of their salaries to a 401(k) plan. Uni-
versal coverage might arise if 401(k)’s spread even more rapidly in the
future than they have in the past, or it might arise as part of a mandatory
saving program. Various types of mandatory saving systems have been
suggested as one way to address the prospective funding diﬃculties of the
Social Security system.
1.2.3 Earnings Histories
Our projections of future 401(k) balances assume that all households
that contribute to a 401(k) plan contribute 9 percent of their earnings. In
PVW (1998a), we show that the average contribution rate as a share of
earnings is extremely stable across earnings deciles. There is, of course,
great variation across households within deciles, but we are interested pri-
marily in forecasting averages. A household’s earnings history is therefore
ac ritical determinant of its 401(k) accumulation.
The starting point of our algorithm is a set of “pseudo-earnings histo-
ries”o fHRS respondents beginning at age twenty-ﬁve. In analyzing the
HRS earnings histories, we have divided the families in the HRS into dec-
iles according to their 1992 earnings. In principle, the Social Security earn-
ings histories of the HRS respondents can be used to determine average
earnings by age within each decile. Venti and Wise (1999) note, however,
that there is one important limitation to this method. Historical earnings
arer eported only up to the Social Security earnings limit, while actual
earnings in the top two or three deciles may be substantially higher than
Social Security reported earnings. Because of this limitation, we rely on
information in the annual March CPS data ﬁles, which report earnings
well above the Social Security maximum.3 Ther atio of the CPS maximum
to the Social Security maximum has ranged from a low of just under 2 in
1981 to a high of more than 20 in 1964. In 1991 the CPS reported earnings
up to a maximum of $200,000, while the Social Security maximum was
$53,400.
Our procedure for constructing earnings histories for HRS households
is as follows. We ﬁrst identify earnings deciles, as described above, using
3. These data were obtained from the CPS Utilities, provided to us by Unicon Inc. We
actually construct a “synthetic HRS” sample of persons aged forty-one to ﬁfty-one in each
of the ten earnings deciles in 1982. This sample is “aged” through 1992, assigning families
to participate and contribute to a 401(k) at rates determined by the estimates from the SIPP
and the CPS and recognizing the possibility of job terminations.
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we calculate earnings deciles by age for the years 1964–91. Using pub-
lished data on median earnings prior to 1964, we extrapolate this series
back to 1956, thereby obtaining earnings histories by decile for the years
1956 to 1991. Finally, we assign each HRS household to a CPS decile ac-
cording tothe household’s1992 earnings decile.The CPSearnings histories
begin at age twenty-ﬁve and a givenh ousehold is assumedt oh ave been
in the same decile since age twenty-ﬁve.4
1.2.4 The Projection Algorithm
Given a household’s pseudo-earnings history, we construct a “pseudo-
401(k) contribution record.” Within each earnings decile, each household
is randomly assigned to 401(k) participation status, based on the 401(k)
participation probabilities discussed above. Then, as the household ages,
we varyi ts 401(k) participation status. In PVW (1998a), we assumed that
if a household had a 401(k) account at a given age, it remained a 401(k)
participant until retirement. In the present paper,w eallow for job separa-
tions that lead some 401(k) participants to become nonparticipants.
To illustrate the procedure, we suppress variation across earnings dec-
iles, which we use in our actual projections. We deﬁne Pa as the participa-
tion rate in 401(k) plans at age a. Suppose that La is the probability that
an a-year-old person with a 401(k) plan leaves his employer. This event
will end a 401(k)-participation spell, although it is possible that another
401(k)-participation spell will begin when the aﬀected individual ﬁnds an-
other job.
The diﬀerence between the fraction of the population participating in
401(k) accounts at ages a and a  1r e ﬂ e cts two oﬀsetting ﬂows. These are
the fraction of the population that enters 401(k) participation at age a, Ea,
and the fraction of the population that participated in a 401(k) plan at age
a,b ut left the 401(k) system by age a  1. The fraction of the population
that leaves a 401(k) job at age a is La  Pa.T he net change in 401(k) partici-
pation at age a is therefore
(2) PP E L P aa a a a + −= −⋅ 1 .
We know the values of Pa1 and Pa,a nd we cane stimate the probability
of job-leaving. We can therefore derive the ﬂow of new entrants to the
401(k) system that is necessary to generate observed age-speciﬁc partici-
pation rates. This is just
(3) EP P L aa a a =− − +1 1 () ,
4. This is a signiﬁcant assumption, since in fact relative household income does vary from
year to year.W hether such variation matters substantially for 401(k) accumulations over a
lifetime is an issue we hope to consider in the future.
34 James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wisewhere Pa denotes the probability of 401(k) participation at the beginning
of the year when a cohort isa g ea,a n dLa denotes the probability of leaving
401(k) participation during the year when the cohort is age a.
New 401(k) entrants must be drawn from the nonparticipant pool at age
a.T he probability that an a-year-old nonparticipant will join a 401(k) plan
(Ja)i ss imply the ratio of the fraction of the population thatr epresents new
401(k) entrants, Ea,t othe fraction that is currently not participating in

























It is possible for someone who joins the 401(k) participant group to be a
previous 401(k) participant. This means that the number of current 401(k)
participants will, in general, diﬀer from the number of individuals who
have ever participated in a 401(k). It also implies that some new entrants
to 401(k) participation at age a will have positive 401(k) balances as a
result of 401(k) participation on a prior job.
We should note in passing that this algorithm for projecting the evolu-
tion of 401(k) participation corrects a previous modeling error. If there is
no chance of leaving a 401(k) job, so that La  0a si no u rp revious work,
then Ja  (Pa1  Pa)/(1  Pa), from equation (4). In PVW (1998a), we
incorrectly set the probability that nonparticipants would become 401(k)
participants to (Pa1  Pa). Thus we underestimated the probability of
joining a 401(k) plan, which had the eﬀecto fu n derstating the fraction of
currently young households who would participate in a 401(k) plan before
retirement. This underestimated the future importance of 401(k) account
balances. We note the size of this error below.
Our projections consider three possible rate-of-return scenarios, corre-
sponding to nominal rates of return of 6.0 percent, 9.3 percent, and 12.7
percent on 401(k) assets. We think of these returns as the returns, on aver-
age, on an all-bond portfolio, a 50-50 split between bonds and stocks, and
an all-stock portfolio. Ibbotson Associates (1997) reports that the histori-
cala verage pretax return on corporate bonds has been 6.0 percent per
year,w hile large-capitalization stocks have returned an average of 12.7
percent per year since 1926. These returns are the pretax returns available
onap o rtfolio with no management fees. Because most 401(k) plans are
administered by ﬁnancial intermediaries who charge for their services, we
also consider the eﬀecto fr educing the feasible return on the bond portfo-
lio by 35 basis points, and the return on the equity portfolio by 70 basis
points. Our calculations highlight the importance of such asset manage-
ment costs in determining 401(k) wealth at retirement.
We also demonstrate the eﬀect of the randomness of stock and bond
returns. We do this by drawing annual returns for our bond and stock
Preretirement Cashouts and Foregone Retirement Savings 35portfolios from the empirical distributions of returns on corporate bonds,
and large company stocks, in Ibbotson Associates (1997). We construct
1,000 projections using this random draw algorithm, and then show the
distribution of returns. It is important to emphasize that randomness rep-
resents macrovariation, which aﬀects all plan members. We do not account
for variation among participants due to diﬀerences in asset allocation
among our three assets, nor do we give attention to individual variation
within earnings deciles due to diﬀerent 401(k) participation rates. More-
over, of course, we do not account for additional variation that would re-
sult from investment in, for example, individual stocks. In future work we
will address this individual risk.
We now turn to the problem of modeling the dynamics of 401(k) ac-
count balances. When a household leaves a job with a 401(k) plan, one of
two things may happen to the accumulated asset balance. In principle, a
job-leaver could decide to divide a 401(k) accumulation between these
alternatives, but we assume that there are no fractional account balances.
First, the job-leaver may decide to preserve the assets in the retirement
system. He or she could leave the assets in the former employer’s 401(k)
plan, although no further contributions would be made, or roll the assets
over into an IRA. In this case, the assets will continue to accumulate until
retirement. We use 1  Qa to denote the probability that 401(k) assets
remain in the retirement system at the time of a job transition.
Second, with probability Qa,ajob-leaver can decide to withdraw the
assets from the 401(k) system. This would trigger a lump-sum distribution,
and would create “leakage” from the stock of retirement assets. We use
the notation Aa to deﬁne 401(k) plan assets for a household of age a,a n d
Ba to denote the asset balance of job-leavers who cash out their 401(k)
assets. We allow Qa to depend on the size of the 401(k) account balance
(Aa)a tthe time of the job termination, so Qa  Qa(Aa).
If r is the rate of return, the equation for the evolution of 401(k) balances
is therefore
(5) AA r C P IB aa a a aa ++ + + =+ + ⋅ ⋅ − 11 1 1 1 () ,
where Ca1 denotes the 401(k) contribution rate as a fraction of income,
and Ia1 denotes household income. We can express Ba as the product of
three terms:
(6) BA L Q A aa a a a =⋅ ⋅ () ,
where Aa is the 401(k) balance at the beginning of the year when a cohort
turns age a, La is the probability of leaving the 401(k) job during that year,
and Qa(Aa)i sthe probability of withdrawing the balance conditional on
leaving the job. We allow the job-leaving probability to vary with age, and
the probability of asset withdrawal conditional on job separation to de-
pend on the accumulated asset balance. We calculate Qa separately for
36 James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wiseeach household, so it depends on each household’s accumulated 401(k)
balance. In future work we hope to expand the set of household character-
istics that aﬀecte ach of these probabilities.
1.2.5 Calibrating the Rates of Job Separation and Cashout
Twok ey parameters that determine the magnitude of 401(k) leakage are
the age-speciﬁc job-leaving probability, La,a nd the asset balance–speciﬁc
probability of cashing out a 401(k) plan balance, Qa(Aa).
There is a substantial literature on both the rate at which jobs end, and
the characteristics of individuals and jobs that are associated with job ter-
mination. For example, Farber (1997) reports age-speciﬁc rates of job los-
ing, and Neumark, Polsky, and Hansen (1999) present recent evidence on
both job turnover rates and job tenure distributions from the CPS. None
of the existing literature provides precisely the values of La that we require.
This is because we are interested in job termination rates for employees at
ﬁrms that oﬀer 401(k) plans. Some previous evidence suggests that job
termination rates are lower at ﬁrms that oﬀer pension plans, and that ter-
mination rates are also declining in the length of the job’s tenure. Gustman
and Steinmeier (1995) report, for example, that in the 1984 and 1985 SIPP,
men aged thirty-one to ﬁfty without a pension had a 19.5 percent annual
separation rate. In the same data set, men with either a deﬁned beneﬁt or
deﬁned contribution pension plan had a 6.1 percent separation rate.
To provide more recent evidence on mobility rates, we analyzed data
from the retrospective section of the HRS. By working backward from the
current job, it is possible to assemble information on both pension cover-
ageo np revious jobs, and on the respondent’s age at the time when the job
ended. Table 1.2 reports our ﬁndings for separation rates at jobs with de-
ﬁned contribution pension plans. The job mobility rates are much lower
than those in most other studies of labor market turnover. For forty-year-
old men, for example, the rate is only about 1.2 percent per year. This may
be an artifact of the long-term retrospective nature of the HRS questions,
or it may be the result of other factors.
Since we are not sure why the HRS-based mobility rates are so low, and
Table 1.2 Probability of Leaving a Job at Various Ages, Conditional on
Job Oﬀering a Deﬁned Contribution Pension Plan







Source: Authors’ tabulations using HRS wave 1.
Preretirement Cashouts and Foregone Retirement Savings 37since very low mobility rates will make the risk of withdrawals from the
401(k) system seem very small, we are reluctant to use the HRS ﬁndings
without some modiﬁcation. We have therefore assumed that the job-
leaving probability (La)f or persons aged twenty-ﬁve to thirty-four is 6.0
percent. We assume that this probability declines to 4.5 percent for those
aged thirty-ﬁve to forty-four and to 4.0 percent for those aged forty-ﬁve to
ﬁfty-four, then rises to 5.0 percent for those aged ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-four.
We believe that an argument can be made for using even lower mobility
rates, in which case the impact of potential 401(k) leakage would be even
smaller than our ﬁndings below suggest.
In calibrating Qa(Aa), the probability of withdrawing assets from a
401(k) plan as a function of the accumulated asset balance, we rely on the
worko fHurd, Lillard, and Panis (1998). They provide the only compre-
hensive analysis of dispositions from deﬁned contribution plans. Their
analysis uses the HRS to calculate the probability of various uses of ex-
isting deﬁned contribution plan balances conditional on a job separation.
We treat their probabilities of retaining an account through the former
employer’s 401(k) plan (their probabilities refer to all deﬁned contribution
plans), rolling assets over into an IRA or other tax-advantaged saving ve-
hicle, and annuitizing the 401(k) balance, as rollovers. Each of these dispo-
sitions has,i nad i ﬀerent way, the eﬀecto fp r eserving the 401(k) balance
so that the assets can be used to support retirement consumption. A fourth
option in their classiﬁcation scheme, cashing out the 401(k) balance, is the
one that we regard as triggering asset leakage from the 401(k) system.
Hurd, Lillard, and Panis (1998) ﬁnd that the likelihood of cashing out
is strongly related to the size of the 401(k) account balance. They provided
us with unpublished tabulations that indicate the cashout probabilities for
various 401(k) balances, as well as the number of observations in the HRS
dataset that were used to estimate each of these balance-speciﬁc probabili-
ties.T able 1.3 reports these probabilities and associated summary statis-
tics. We use the data in table 1.3 to assign randomly the balances of job-
leavers to cashout or rollover status.
One diﬃculty that arises in using a set of balance-speciﬁc probabilities
for asset withdrawal, as we use here, is that the Hurd, Lillard, and Panis
(1998) ﬁndings relate to balances at a single point in time. We need to
apply them to potential 401(k) cashouts over an entire working lifetime.
To do this we assume that 401(k) balances at diﬀerent dates can bec o n -
verted to balances in 1992 dollars using a 3.2 percent annual inﬂation rate.
1.3 Validating the Algorithm: Projecting 401(k) Balances for
Current Health and Retirement Survey Households
Before projecting the 401(k) assets at retirement for future cohorts of
retirees,w et ried to evaluate the ability of our algorithm to predict the
38 James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wiseobserved 401(k) balances of current cohorts of retirees and near-retirees.
We use our algorithm to predict 401(k) balances for households in the
HRS. We did this using a basic version of our algorithm, without any
administrative costs for 401(k) asset management and with certain returns.
In essence, we ask whether the SIPP cohort data on 401(k) participation,
together with the CPS data on contributions, can explain the observed
distribution of 401(k) balances in the HRS. While a high correspondence
between actual and predicted values in this case does not necessarily dem-
onstrate the validity of our algorithm, it provides at least one way of check-
ing for the plausibility of our ﬁndings.
Table 1.4 reports the mean 1992 assets of the HRS respondents, stra-
tiﬁed according to earnings decile. (This table is drawn from PVW 1998a.)
It provides a point of reference against which to evaluate our projected
401(k) balances. The table reports only mean asset balances because our
401(k) balance projections focus on means. While the median asset hold-
ings for many categories are substantially below the mean holdings, the
primary comparison that we make is between 401(k) balances and Social
Security wealth. Mean and median Social Security wealth are very similar.
We estimate accrued Social Security wealth at age sixty-ﬁve for the HRS
respondents, assuming that each respondent were to work until that age. A
family’s Social Security wealth is the simple sum of the mortality-weighted
present value of each member’s beneﬁt stream; we do not consider survi-
vorship beneﬁts, which could raise the total value of Social Security wealth
by more than one-third. These accrued beneﬁt levels are converted to 1992
dollars using the Social Security Administration’s intermediate forecast of
the average annual interest rate provided by the board of trustees of the
Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASD) trust fund. For
comparability, the projected 401(k) balances discussed below also assume
Table 1.3 Probability of Cashing Out a Deﬁned Contribution Plan, Conditional
on Opportunity to Withdraw Funds and on Size of Deﬁned
Contribution Balance
401(k) Balance at Time of Number of Sample Cashout










Source: Tabulations from the HRS by Constantijn Panis.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.that a person works until age sixty-ﬁve. The actual HRS 401(k) balances
reported in table 1.4, however, are 1992 balances when the respondents
were aged ﬁfty-one to sixty-one. Personal retirement balances could easily
double by the time the respondents attain age sixty-ﬁve, through the com-
bined eﬀecto fasset returns and additional contributions during remaining
years of employment.
When the 401(k) program began in 1982, members of the 1992 HRS
sample were forty-one to ﬁfty-one years old. We assume that in 1982, these
families began to participate in 401(k) plans at rates estimated from the
SIPP and to contribute at rates estimated from the CPS. We ask how close
simulated balances based on these assumptions are to the actual 1992 bal-
ances of the HRS respondents.
We ﬁrst use the SIPP data to estimate participation proﬁles by age for
the cohorts whose members were ﬁfty-one to ﬁfty-ﬁve and ﬁfty-six to sixty
in 1992, at the time of the HRS. Then, to estimate contributions, we use
family earnings histories, derived as described above. Within each earnings
decile, beginning in 1982, we randomly assign families to participation
status, based on SIPP estimates of participation by age and earnings decile
foreach of the two cohorts. We then randomly assign job-change and cash-
out status, also as described above. Based on our estimates from the CPS
data, we assume a contribution rate of 8 percent in all years between 1982
and 1992. This is somewhat less than the average rate of 8.7 percent—
including both employee and employer matching contributions—reported
in the 1993 CPS data, and the 9 percent rate that we assume throughout
ourp rojections of future 401(k) balances. This is because there is some
evidence that 401(k) contribution rates have increased over time, and we
are trying to track the 1982–92 experience.
Table 1.5 shows our projected 401(k) balances, as of 1992, for the HRS
sample. This table is similar to a table in PVW (1998a), but it is based on
an algorithm that allows for job terminations. The table reports results
stratiﬁed by earnings decile. On average, the simulated values do not diﬀer
greatly from the observed balances reported in the HRS. Using the bond
rate of return seems to give the closest match. Even the simulated balances
by earnings decile are typically not far from the HRS reported balances.
These results suggest that with roughly accurate assumptions about contri-
bution and participation behavior, we are able to replicate the actual distri-
bution of 401(k) balances. We do not necessarily view our ability to track
the past evolution of 401(k) balances as a strong endorsement for the fu-
ture success of our algorithm, because our historical success does not pro-
vide any evidence that our assumptions for the future are plausible.
1.4 Projections of 401(k) Balances of Future Retirees
We nowu se ourp rojection algorithm to estimate the balances at age
sixty-ﬁve of future cohorts. We assume that our estimated earnings proﬁles





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.represent the past earnings of the HRS families, and we estimate what
they would have accumulated in a 401(k) had they had the participation
rates that we project for the C(25) and C(15) cohorts. We also consider
what would have happened if there had been universal 401(k) coverage in
past years. The projections reported below assume a 35 basis point annual
administrative cost on 401(k) investments in bonds, and a 70 basis point
cost on stock investments.
Table 1.6 reports the results of our projections for the C(25) cohort, the
group that will turn sixty-ﬁve in 2024. The ﬁrst column of the table shows
the average value of Social Security wealth for each earnings decile. The
remaining columns show our projected 401(k) balances when the C(25)
cohort reaches age sixty-ﬁve. These values are reported in 1992 dollars, for
comparability with the ﬁrst column. Our projected 401(k) balances are the
pretax balances in 401(k) accounts. A family with these balances would
pay taxes as the 401(k) balance was drawn down, so the after-tax value of
the 401(k) accumulation is smaller than what we report. In contrast, no
tax will be paid on most Social Security beneﬁts. To place our estimates
in perspective, it is helpful to refer to the family wealth data in table 1.4.
One statistic that provides a useful point of reference is the mean actual
1992 balance in 401(k) accounts for HRS respondents: $10,808. We can
compare the average value of projected 401(k) balances against this mag-
nitude. In addition, we can compare the 401(k) balances to Social Security
wealth, under current provisions, and these values are shown in the ﬁrst
column of the table.
Table 1.6 shows two components of 401(k) accumulation, or potential
accumulation, for each asset allocation assumption. The ﬁrst column un-
der each assumption is the sum of the projected 401(k) balance plus the
balances in any rollover accounts at age sixty-ﬁve. Since we view assets
that are kept within the retirement saving system as tantamount to 401(k)
assets, we group these two asset categories together. We do not report the
split between 401(k) and rollover assets, although in many of our projec-
tions, the rollover balance actually exceeded that in the 401(k) account.
We suspect that this reﬂects job mobility rates that are too high, over some
ager anges, for our 401(k) participants. We also report the value of “Fore-
gone Saving” for each earnings decile. This is the additional amount that
would have been available for retirement support had the assets not been
cashed out. It is the value of simulated 401(k) withdrawals accumulated
to ages ixty-ﬁve under various assumptions about the rate of return on
401(k) assets. Engelhardt (1999) presents a similar statistic for actual
lump-sum distributions claimed by HRS respondents.
Ther e sults in table 1.6 suggest that preretirement withdrawals from
401(k) plans do not have signiﬁcant eﬀects on 401(k) balances at retire-
ment. For those who will reach retirement in 2024, the C(25) cohort, we
project 401(k) assets at retirement ranging from $57,900 to $181,400,


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.depending on our assumption about how the assets are invested. These
levels are large relative to the average Social Security wealth of $103,400
for these households, and they are much larger than the (actual) mean
401(k) balance of $10,800 in 1992, when the HRS respondents were aged
ﬁfty-one to sixty-one.
Fore ach projection, the ratio of projected 401(k) to Social Security
wealth varies a great deal depending on lifetime earnings. Because the
C(25) projections assume the continuation of current low participation
rates in the lowest income deciles, families in the 1st and 2nd income dec-
iles accumulate very little in 401(k) assets, no matter what the rate of re-
turn. Beginning with the 3rd decile, however, 401(k) assets at retirement
would likely be substantial relative to Social Security wealth. For families
with incomes in the upper four deciles of the income distribution, the
mean 401(k) balance exceeds Social Security wealth provided at least half
of the 401(k) assets were allocated to stocks. The after-tax income associ-
ated with the 401(k) balance could still fall below the value of Social Secu-
rity payments for some of these households, since 401(k) distributions are
likely to be taxed more heavily than Social Security beneﬁts.
If 401(k) participants invest all of their assets in stocks, and if stocks
continue to deliver returns like those in the last seven decades, then 401(k)
plus rollover wealth would exceed Social Security wealth (on average) in
the ﬁve highest income deciles. Since Social Security beneﬁts do not rise
substantially with lifetime income above roughly the median of the income
distribution, it is not surprising that 401(k) balances, which are based on
contributions that were proportional to earnings, become larger than So-
cial Security beneﬁts at higher income levels. We suspect that our C(25)
projections underestimate future 401(k) participation by low-income
households, but we have yet to ﬁnd a way to address this diﬃculty.
As emphasized above, in comparing the projected diﬀerences inp a r tic-
ipation rates by earnings decile, it is important to recognize that actual
experience forp articular households could well be quite diﬀerent from our
mean projections, even if our average participation rates are realistic. The
dispersion of 401(k) accumulations is substantial in every earnings decile.
Thes econdc o lumn under each assumed asset allocation heading in
table 1.6 reports the value that 401(k) assets that were withdrawn in the
form of lump-sum distributions would have attained if theyh ad been al-
lowed to remain within the 401(k) system. The results show that the value
of this foregone saving is small relative to the value of 401(k) balances for
most earnings deciles. On average, the foregone saving is less than 5 per-
cent of the value of the 401(k) and rollover balance. For households in the
bottom deciles of the earnings distribution, the foregone saving is larger
relative to the 401(k) accumulation. This is because we have assumed that
the probability of cashing out a smaller 401(k) balance is larger than that
foral arger balance. Households in the bottom part of the earnings distri-
Preretirement Cashouts and Foregone Retirement Savings 45bution arem ore likely to have small balances than are households higher
up in the earnings distribution.
One way to place the magnitude of such lump-sum distributions in per-
spective is to note that the impact of a 35 or 70 basis point annual admin-
istrative charge on 401(k) accounts is much larger, in terms of assets at
retirement, than the impact of lump-sum distributions. The foregone sav-
ing, due to preretirement withdrawals, reduces accumulated assets in the
all-bond portfolio by 3.5 percent and in the all-stock portfolio by 4.4 per-
cent.I fw eh ad not charged 401(k) accounts with any expenses for invest-
ment management, the projections would have ranged from $61,200 to
$209,200, or between 5 and 13 percent greater than the projections we re-
port. That is, the administration expense reduces accumulated balances
in the bond portfolio by 5.4 percent and balances in the stock portfolio by
13.3 percent. Thus, reductions in administrative expenses could do more
to increase saving than reduction in preretirement withdrawals.
Table 1.7 presents information similar to that in table 1.6, except that
we nowf ocus on the C(15) cohort. Under the C(15) assumptions, the mean
401(k) balances at age sixty-ﬁve range from $74,300 to $247,100. These
projections imply substantially larger 401(k) assets relative to Social Secu-
rity wealth for the lower earnings deciles than the earlier C(25) projections.
In the C(15) case, even the families in the 3rd decile could accumulate
pretax 401(k) assets that could be an important fraction of Social Security
wealth. If 401(k) accounts were invested in assets that earned returns as
high as those on equities in the last seventy years, then even those in the
4th income decile would accumulate 401(k) assets that were larger, on av-
erage, than their Social Security wealth.
Finally, table 1.8 presents additional information like that in tables 1.6
and 1.7, except that we now consider the case of universal coverage for
401(k) plans. In modeling universal coverage, we assume that all workers
contribute to a 401(k) plan, but that they may withdraw their accumulated
401(k) balances if they change jobs. One could alternatively model the
case in which account balances must be held until the individual reaches
ages ixty-ﬁve. By adding together our 401(k) and rollover balance, and the
foregone saving entry, we can evaluate the balance that would accumulate
in such accounts.
We project that universal 401(k) coverage, even with withdrawals al-
lowed at job change, would result in substantially higher mean 401(k) bal-
ances at age sixty-ﬁve than either our C(25) or C(15) participation assump-
tions. The diﬀerences are particularly pronounced in the lower part of the
income distribution. We project mean 401(k) balances at age sixty-ﬁve
ranging from $98,100 to $356,300, depending on the asset allocation for
401(k) accounts. Universal coverage could yield mean pretax 401(k) bal-
ances that would exceed Social Security wealth in all but the lowest life-
time earnings decile, at least if 401(k) investors earned returns comparable


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.to those on equities over the last seven decades. In the case of universal
coverage, 401(k) assets would almost surely represent an important share
of Social Security wealth even in the lowest income deciles.
Ther e sults in tables 1.6–1.8 can be used to assess the importance of our
earlier modeling error in the deﬁnition of Ja.B yadding together the
“401(k)  Rollover” column and the “Foregone Saving” column, we can
estimate the total 401(k) balance at retirement if there were no potential
withdrawals. Table 1.9 reports new calculations that are comparable to our
previous estimates. In particular, our previous calculations did not allow
fora dministrative costs on 401(k) investments. The results in table 1.9 pre-
serve this assumption, and therefore diﬀer from the results in tables 1.6
and 1.7. Comparing the results in table 1.9 with those in our earlier paper
suggests that our modeling error understated the projections by about 20
percent.
All of our projections so far assume that 401(k) investors earn the same
return in every year, conditional on their asset allocations. In practice,
both stock and bond returns are random, and there is substantial uncer-
tainty surrounding the retirement wealth that will be associated with a
given contribution history. To consider this possibility, we replaced our
assumption of certain returns with a random returns scenario. We illus-
trate our ﬁndings for the C(25) cohort. In each year of our projection, we
draw one value from the post-1926 distribution of actual bond and stock
returns reported in Ibbotson Associates (1997). Because returns are now
random, the projected value of 401(k) balances at retirement will diﬀer
across projections, depending on the random returns that happen to be
Table 1.9 Projected 401(k) Balances at Retirement as Reported in Poterba, Venti, and
Wise (1998a)
Cohort C(15) (age 65 in 2034) Cohort C(25) (age 65 in 2024)
Earnings
Decile Bonds 50-50 Stocks Bonds 50-50 Stocks
1st 974 1,839 3,699 2,556 4,927 10,123
2nd 5,759 10,691 21,175 12,605 24,000 48,841
3rd 13,092 24,173 47,843 24,506 46,469 94,560
4th 24,820 45,500 89,863 41,142 77,766 158,417
5th 32,848 59,385 115,971 53,390 99,686 201,061
6th 45,282 81,172 159,549 69,710 129,458 260,355
7th 74,286 134,308 262,478 98,953 184,478 372,183
8th 98,624 177,764 346,543 124,006 229,812 461,382
9th 134,707 240,686 465,290 159,150 292,720 583,877
10th 204,271 357,826 680,483 233,532 420,937 825,739
All 63,466 113,394 219,289 81,955 151,034 301,654
Source: Authors’ calculations as described in the text. Results for universal 401(k) participation are the
same as those in Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1998a).
Preretirement Cashouts and Foregone Retirement Savings 49drawn in a given projection. We ran 1,000 such projections for the C(25)
cohort, and tabulated our ﬁndings.
Table 1.10 shows the distribution of the mean 401(k) wealth at retire-
ment, averaged across all earnings deciles. The entries in this table are
comparable to the last row of table 1.6. The results are graphed in ﬁgure
1.3. The results show that the median 401(k) balance at retirement, espe-
cially when a substantial share of the 401(k) portfolio is invested in equi-
ties, is below the mean. In the case of a 50-50 bond-stock portfolio, for
example, table 1.6 shows a mean 401(k) and rollover balance of $98,800,
while the median value is $94,600. The mean in this case lies between the
50th and 60th percentiles of the distribution. For the all-stock case, the
mean is between the 60th and 70th percentiles of the distribution of real-
ized outcomes. The most appropriate single measure is unclear. The results
also draw attention to the great diﬀerences between the bond and stock
distributions. For example, 95 percent of bond returns are below $85,800,
buto nly slightly more than 20 percent of stock returns are below this level.
We plan further work in the future on random asset returns and the
growth of 401(k) balances. The results above, however, make clear the
wide variation in potential system-wide returns, especially stock market
returns.
1.5 An Early Review of Post-1993 401(k) Participation
and Contribution Behavior
Thep rojections of future 401(k) growth reported above were based on
1993 data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation. We now
have SIPP data for 1996 which permit us to evaluate the plausibility of
our 1993-based projections. We have not yet recalibrated the projections
to use the 1996 data, because we are waiting for some additional SIPP in-
formation on pension coverage and household net worth.
The 1996 SIPP data suggest that, if anything, our projections for 401(k)
expansion have been conservative. Figure 1.4 is just like ﬁgure 1.1, but
with two additions. The 1996 data have been added for each cohort, and
data for two younger cohorts—C(22) and C(17)—have been added. The
C(27) starting point for our earlier projections is circled. It is clear that
eligibility rates have continued to rise. The ﬁgure shows age-speciﬁc 401(k)
eligibility rates for diﬀerent age cohorts.
Figure 1.5 shows participation rates for these same cohorts, including
the 1996 data. The participation-rate increases between 1993 and 1996
were very substantial. Following the dotted lines on the ﬁgure can identify
diﬀerences between the participation rates of successive cohorts at selected
ages.F or example, the participation rate of persons in the C(27) cohort at
age thirty-eight was about 10 percentage points higher than the rate of
persons in the C(32) cohort at age thirty-eight. The diﬀerence between the


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.C(17) and C(22) cohorts at age twenty-eight is 8 percentage points. Recall
that our projections assume that 401(k) participation rises by 20 percent-
age points every ten years. Note that while we refer to the latest data as
being from 1996, in fact, these data were collected closer to 2.5 years after
the 1993 survey. Thus the annual increase in eligibility has been greater
than the graphical comparison implies.5
Figure 1.5 includes the information in ﬁgure 1.2 as well as 1996 data
and data for the C(22) cohort. The actual eligibility rate of the C(27) cohort
at age thirty-eight is in fact somewhat greater than our projected rate. In
addition, the C(22) rate at age thirty-three is well above the projected rate
for the C(25) cohort at that age. These comparisons suggest that our pro-
jections are conservative, at least over their ﬁrst few years. One of our
future plans is to use the 1996 data, along with new SIPP-based informa-
tion on asset balances, to recalibrate our benchmark participation and
contribution rates for diﬀerent ages.
1.6 Conclusions and Future Directions
This paper presents new evidence on amount of retirement saving that
currently-working households are likely to accumulate in their 401(k)
plans. Today’s young and middle-aged households have much higher
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Fig. 1.3 Distribution of 401(k) assets for the C(25) cohort
5. The actual survey dates and the number of “years” after the 1984 wave 4, which was
interviewed between September and December 1994, are as follows: 1985 wave 7 and 1986
wave 4, January–April 1987 (two years); 1990 wave 4, February–May 1991 (six years); 1991
wave7a nd 1992 wave 4, February–May 1993 (eight years); and 1993 wave 9, October 1995–
January 1996 (eleven years).Fig. 1.5 401(k) eligibility by cohort with illustrative projections and 1996 data
Fig. 1.4 401(k) eligibility by cohort, 1984, 1987, 1991, 1993, 1996401(k) participation rates than current retirees did at similar ages. In addi-
tion, the rate of 401(k) participation has risen and seems likely to continue
to rise for all age groups. As a result, 401(k) saving is likely to play a much
larger part in the ﬁnancial preparation for retirement of future retirees
than it has for current and past retirees.
We present new estimates of the amount of such saving that households
reaching age sixty-ﬁve in 2024, and in 2034, are likely to accumulate. We
improve on previous estimates by recognizing explicitly the possibility of
preretirement withdrawals from the 401(k) system through lump-sum dis-
tributions, and by allowing for asset management costs associated with
401(k) accounts. We ﬁnd that lump-sum distributions have a relatively
small impact on the amount of saving that households accumulate in
401(k) accounts. The possibility of taking lump-sum distributions appears
to reduce retirement accumulations by only about 5 percent relative to
what they would be if households were prevented from taking such distri-
butions. This eﬀecti ssmaller than the eﬀecto fallowing for modest admin-
istrative expenses for these accounts.
Our calculations assume that participation and contribution behavior
would be the same if there were no lump-sum distributions as they are at
present. In fact, the very option of withdrawing assets as a lump sum may
encourage 401(k) participation by some households. Recognizing the po-
tential eﬀecto f401(k) plan provisions on participation decisions is a topic
we reservef or future work.
Projecting the average 401(k) account balance for those who will retire
two and three decades into the future is necessarily fraught with great
uncertainty. Some sources of uncertainty, such as systematic changes in
household attitudes toward saving, or reforms of the Social Security sys-
tem that alter the basic structure of ﬁnancial preparation for retirement,
are diﬃcult to predict. There are other sources of uncertainty in our pro-
jections, however, that can be reduced with further empirical work.
One diﬃculty with our current algorithm is that it is based on data that
are lessr eliable for younger individuals than for older ones. With respect
to lump-sum distributions, the CPS asks only individuals over age forty
about their pension beneﬁts and past lump-sum payouts. The HRS, the
other premier source of information on pension beneﬁts, is limited because
the basic sampling frame was individuals between the ages of ﬁfty-one and
sixty-two in 1992. Although the HRS includes retrospective questions that
elicit some data on employment transitions before individuals joined the
HRS panel, there is naturally some concern about the quality of the re-
sulting data for job separations that occurred long ago. Job transitions that
occur early in an individual’s career typically do not involve large 401(k)
balances, but because there are many years remaining before the individ-
uals receiving these balances would retire, they could grow to represent
substantial retirement resources.
54 James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. WiseAs econda reai nw hich our algorithm could be improved is in the link
between job separation and job tenure. Jobs that have already lasted a
long time tend to have lower probabilities of ending than do “younger”
jobs. At the moment, our algorithm allows for age-dependent probabilities
of job separation, but we have not allowed for an individual’s job tenure,
or an individual’s earnings decile, to aﬀect the probability of a job transi-
tion and the associated possibility of a 401(k) withdrawal. The ideal data-
base foro ur purposes would identify workers who participate in 401(k)
plans, and would then permit estimates of job-change probabilities condi-
tional on age, earnings, and the worker’s job tenure. The signiﬁcant expan-
sion of the set of questions about pension coverage in the 1996 SIPP
should provide much of the information that is needed for such a de-
tailed calculation.
Finally, our analysis has focused on retirement as an event that occurs
at ages ixty-ﬁve. In practice, some 401(k) participants are likely to leave
the labor force before that age, and therefore to begin drawing down their
401(k) account balances earlier than our assumptions imply. Other work-
ers may remain in the labor force after age sixty-ﬁve, particularly in future
decades when the Social Security retirement age is higher than at present.
For these workers, 401(k) assets are likely to be larger than our projections
suggest, both because they will have more years for accruing tax-deferred
returns and because they will contribute for more years than our calcula-
tions suggest. Allowing for a distribution of retirement ages is something
we hope to incorporate in future versions of our algorithm.
In addition, although we give some attention to the system-wide risk
that is due to randomness in market returns, we do not treat the additional
individual risk that is due to 401(k) participation and individual asset allo-
cation decisions.
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Comment John B. Shoven
This paper is about a very important topic for those who set public policy
forp ensionsa nd retirement. The paper tries to gauge the importance of
withdrawals from pension saving accounts that occur at the time of prere-
tirement job changes. While there is some evidence that there are a large
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56 James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wisenumber of such lump-sum withdrawals, closers crutiny reveals that most
of the withdrawals are for small accounts held by young participants. The
bottom line of this paper is that the consequences of lump-sum withdraw-
als for average future 401(k) balances in retirement are relatively minor.
The authors project that the impact of lump-sum withdrawals will be a 5
percent reduction in future average 401(k) retirement balances.
The authors have been responsive to the suggestions that I made as the
discussant at the conference. This makes it more diﬃcult to criticize the
papera si tn ow stands. First, they now include administrative expenses in
their 401(k) simulations and show that such expenses reduce the accumu-
lations more than lump-sum withdrawals do. This is one of the most im-
portant results of the paper. The expenses that the authors include (35
basispoints per year for the bond account and 75 basis points for the stock
account) are relatively modest. Nonetheless, they can reduce the ﬁnal ac-
cumulations of participants by as much as 13.3 percent. Some 401(k) accu-
mulation vehicles impose expenses twice as high as modeled here. Clearly,
participants should monitor expenses of their portfolio managers closely.
The authors calculate the average 401(k) balances for the cohort reach-
ing age sixty-ﬁve in 2024. They project that these average balances will
rangef rom 0.5 to 2.0 times average Social Security wealth. While one can
quarrelw ith the parameters that go into these projections, the basic mes-
sage that 401(k) plans will be strikingly more important to future retirees
than they are today is unassailable. Their careful treatment of cohort ef-
fects is essential in predicting the future importance of these plans.
Now that the aggregate importance of the plans and the aggregate un-
importance of withdrawals are established, what is needed is a thorough
examination of the risks and uncertainties of 401(k) plans both at the in-
dividual level and in aggregate. At the individual level, there is much
heterogeneity in terms of contribution rates, asset allocation, length of
career, management expenses, and withdrawals from plans. The issue that
would be nice to address is whether the beneﬁts of 401(k) plans are more
unevenly distributed than Social Security due to the interaction of all of
these eﬀects. It would also be interesting to simulate the eﬀecto fdisal-
lowing lump-sum withdrawals on the distribution of outcomes in addition
to the eﬀecto na verage outcomes. Similarly, it would be interesting to
know whether many participants take unnecessary risks by failing to di-
versify their 401(k) portfolios. At the aggregate level, there is some chance
that the returns on assets over the next twenty-ﬁve or thirty-ﬁve years will
notb ed rawn from the same random distribution that generated the re-
turns over the last forty years. It is the nature of retirement saving plans
that the late returns are more important than the early ones because the
late ones apply to more of the contributions. The point estimates of aver-
age 401(k) wealth at retirement in this paper are interesting, but there is
considerable uncertainty about the actual outcomes that will be observed.
Preretirement Cashouts and Foregone Retirement Savings 57Of course, to some extent the same can be said about future Social Secu-
rity beneﬁts. They also may not materialize as currently promised.
I think this is a very good paper that makes its main points eﬀectively.
Lump-sum withdrawals are not as important a problem for 401(k) plans
as some people may have originally thought. Management expenses, for
instance, are more important. Now, what is called for, and what seems to
be on the authors’ agenda, is an assessment of the individual risks that
401(k) participants bear. I look forward to the next installment of the Pot-
erba, Venti, and Wise series of articles.
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